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THE EXTERNALITIES OF A TORREY
CANYON SITUATION; AN IMPETUS FOR
CHANGE IN LEGISLATION
HENRY J. McGURRENt
On Saturday, March 18, 1967, the Torrey Canyon was reported
aground on Seven Stones reef between the Isles of Scilly and Lands
End. She was bound for Milford Haven carrying 119,328 tons of
crude oil.1 She hit Pollard Rock at the speed of approximately 15.75
knots, 2 rupturing all six starboard tanks. By Monday, March 20,
about 30,000 tons of oil had spilled into the sea. Within a week's
time, 100 miles of British coastline were affected. 3 On March 26th,
high seas and strong winds resulted in the release of another 30,000
tons of crude oil. By Monday, March 27, the United Kingdom decided that there was no hope of removing the hulk, therefore she
was bombed in an unsuccessful attempt to burn the remaining oil. In
spite of efforts to control the oil spill through the use of straw,
booms and detergents, the damage to the British coastline was reported to be $8 million. This did not include the costs to local
governments and private agencies, nor did it account for the damages
to the French coastline. 4 This incident focused world-wide attention
on the need for appropriate changes in legislation to compel the oil
shipping industry to take steps to prevent such accidents now and in
the future, and in the event of an accident to have adequate financial
responsibility to compensate those who would be injured.
This article will discuss some economic and legislative considerations associated with the oil shipping industry's decision to carry oil.
This discussion will center on the questions: who should bear the
cost of preventing and cleaning-up oil spills, what amount of resources should be expended to prevent an oil spill, what amount of
resources should be expended to clean-up an oil spill, and what
mechanism would accomplish these tasks with an efficient and equitable result?
tAssociate, law firm of McCarty & Noone, Washington, D.C.; Formerly Assistant Division
Counsel, Corps of Engineers North Central Division; BA 1965 University of Arizona, JD
1968 University of Arizona Law School, LLM (Natural Resources Law) 1969 George
Washington University National Law Center. Member of the Bars of Illinois and the District
of Columbia.
1. H.R. Rep. No. 628, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1967).

2. Id.at 28.

3. It is not difficult to foresee the possible damages when one notes that fifteen tons of
crude oil will cover eight square miles of ocean area within a week. Rienow, The Oil Around
Us, N.Y. Times June 4, 1967, at 24 (Magazine).
4. Oil Pollution, A Report to the President, a special study requested by President
Johnson and conducted by the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Transportation, at 4 (February, 1968).
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ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS
A. Allocation of Resources to Prevent an Oil Spill
Efficient allocations of resources are made through the interplay
of market forces. There are situations, however, where the market
mechanism does not lead to such efficiency. An example of such a
failure is the shipping of oil in such a way that fish and birds are
poisoned by oil pollution. The failure arises because the decisions
concerning the way oil is transported do not always take into
account all the effects of that decision. Here we shall briefly examine
the market mechanism and its failure to function properly, and then
show how to deal with this failure to prevent oil pollution.'
To deal effectively with a failure of the market mechanism one
must understand how the economy functions. The economist's
model of the competitive market shows how choices concerning resources are made in a decentralized decision making system (competitive markets and individual decision makers who attempt to
maximize their satisfaction and their profit). Assuming maximum
satisfaction of consumer preferences this model will produce the
goods and services desired by the consumer in just the amounts
desired in the cheapest possible way. Each resource will be used up
to the point where the cost of the next unit is equal to its contribution to the value of production. If this is a mobile resource and
uniform throughout the market, the market price paid for it represents the product which that resource could have generated in
another line of activity. Production elsewhere is reduced by a dollar's
worth of production. Thus, it can be said that the market price of
the given resource is equal to its opportunity cost (its contribution to
output in any alternative use).
Because consumers attempt to satisfy themselves as much as possible with their given amount of income, they will allocate their
expenditure so that their last dollar spent upon any item will yield an
amount of satisfaction equal to the last dollar spent on any other
item. Thus, the price of an item reflects its worth to consumers and
these prices guide investment and production.
Through the functioning of this system the most efficient use of
our resources is made. When efficiency is at a maximum, no resources are wasted; there cannot be more production of any one
good without less production of another, and one household cannot
consume more unless another consumes less.6 However, in this
5. Kneese & Bower, Managing Water Quality: Economics, Technology, Institutions
75-142 (1968).
6. D. Watson, Price Theory And Its Uses 254 (1963).
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model of the competitive market there exist certain failures which
result in an inefficient use of our resources. These failures are known
as "externalities" or "spillovers" which can be defined as
the impacts of the activities of households, public agencies, or enterprises upon the activities of other households, public agencies, or
enterprises which are exerted otherwise than through the market.
They are, in other words, relationships other than those between
buyer and seller.7
Since there are relationships other than those between the buyer and
seller, decisions concerning the use of natural resources do not
always take into account all the effects of the use. An example of an
externality is the oil pollution created by tanker spills. Another
example of an externality would be fishermen's use of a fishery. In a
given fishery, once a certain intensity of fishing is reached, the stock
of fish is reduced with the result that fishing is more costly and
difficult for each fisherman. When a fisherman catches a fish this
adds to the cost of all the other fishermen. The impact of each
fisherman's activity upon the others' activity is reciprocal while the
impact of the activity of carrying oil by tankers is both reciprocal, in
that the tankers one shipper places upon the waters increases another
shipper's cost due to the likelihood of a collision and overcrowding
of the waters and facilities; and unidirectional, in that the impact of
the oil shipping industry places a cost on the beach owner, for the
beach owner's activity does not make it more costly for the shipper.
More specifically these are examples of technological externalities,
those which affect the physical outputs that other producers can get
from their physical inputs. The physical outputs in both of the above
examples would be affected by a reduction in the amount of fish
caught, despite an equivalent amount of inputs (i.e. time spent fishing).
The result of the failure of the market mechanism to take into
account these technological spillovers is the allocation of resources in
a less than optimal way and certain inequities. If no price is placed
upon the risk of oil pollution created by the carrying of oil by
tankers, there will result an overproduction and overconsumption of
oil related and derived products and an underconsumption of other
products such as those of the fishing industry. The reason for the
overproduction is that the cost of the risk associated with the transporting of oil by tanker is not compensated for by the decision
maker. As more oil is shipped, there will be more petroleum related
7. R. Turvey, Side Effects of Resource Use, in Environmental Quality in a Growing

Economy 47 (H. Jarett ed. 1966).
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products placed on the market shifting the supply curve to the right
and resulting in a lower price. 8 The lower price for these products is
noted as artificial cheapness. The market mechanism is not producing
the goods and services desired in the cheapest possible way. Instead,
too many resources are being used up in the transportation of oil by
tankers causing oil products to be cheap and overconsumed, and
causing the products of other industries using those same resources
to be expensive, underproduced and underconsumed. 9 When the
costs of the pollution fall upon such industries as the fishing industry, the result will be a reduction in fish caught, shifting the
supply curve to the left and causing an increase in the price of fish.
Thus, fish would be artificially expensive. Also, resources not used as
a result of underproduction of fish products will become more available and less expensive, and cause products that use these resources
to be less expensive.1 0 Therefore, due to the externalities caused by
oil pollution, the consumer will not have the production of goods
and services in the amounts desired in the cheapest possible way. It is
also quite evident that to have the oil pollution costs fall upon industries, other than those creating the pollution, is inequitable.
When these technological externalities are ignored by decision
making entities such as those engaged in the activity of shipping oil
by vessel, little effort is made to limit the risk of oil spills. It is
obvious that if the shipper does not have to pay for the damages
done to others or the cleanup expenses caused by oil spills, he will do
little to stop the spillage. Thus, too few resources are allocated to the
prevention of oil spills.
For the most efficient allocation of our resources, the prevention
of oil spills and the most equitable solution, some form of intervention should be made which imposes upon the decision making
entity the costs of the technological externalities. Since such intervention would not be co-ordinated by the market mechanism, it can
be said that it involves the creation of a market where none existed
before.
Such intervention could take the form of legislation of regulations.
In the example of the fishermen reducing the stock by taking fish
from the fishery, this reciprocal technological externality could be
8. Assuming that the demand remains constant and is not perfectly elastic.

9. This is an example of a pecuniary externality. These are occasioned by shift in prices.
R. McKean, Efficiency In Government Through Systems Analysis 137 (1966).
10. This is an example of a pecuniary externality. Id. at 137.
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compensated for by regulating the size of fish allowed to be kept and
limiting the number of fishermen allowed to fish. Such regulation
would ultimately result in an increase in the stock, making fishing
easier. In the example of the oil shipping industry, the risk of pollution could be reduced by the following types of regulation: regulation of speed, thickness of hulls, radar equipment, equipment inspection, officer and crew training, and compulsory insurance. These
regulations would place some or perhaps all of the cost of the unidirectional technological externality upon the oil shipper, thereby
reducing the risk of a spill and thus achieving a more efficient
allocation of resources.
Such intervention could also take the form of a tax, a charge, or a
payoff. While one form of intervention might be more effective in
properly allocating resources to prevent a spill, the result is the placement of the cost of the externality on the decision-maker.' 1
The important question then becomes, to what extent should resources be allocated to prevent oil pollution? Roland N. McKean
states:'

2

.. the existence of a side effect does not automatically mean that a
better situation is attainable, and only rarely would complete elimination of an existing side effect be economical. To eliminate an
external cost completely would be much like producing any com-

modity to the point where the marginal value would be zero, and
this is rarely appropriate, because at that point one is surely
sacrificing other outputs that have more value than this output.
In other words, action concerning an externality is only appropriate
if the gains promise to exceed the costs. This principle can be
illustrated by an individual firm engaged in shipping oil and another
firm engaged in commercial fishing. For simplicity, we will assume
the area where these two firms are located has no other users, and
has only $60 worth of fish. It will also be assumed that if the shipper
spills oil, no matter how small the amount, all $60 worth of fish will
be killed. Assume further that the fishing firm has no fixed capital,
and that it uses resources with a value of $50 that can be transferred
at no cost to other productive uses. If during the year the firm would
have to expend the $50 worth of resources to catch all the fish, the
return on the investment is only $10. Therefore, if the oil shipper
11. For a discussion of various forms of such intervention, see Turvey, Side Effects of
Resource Use, in Environmental Quality In a Growing Economy 47-69 (H. Jarett ed. 1966).
A regulation may be less effective than some other form of intervention in that it does not
offer an incentive to take steps to prevent pollution beyond compliance with the stated
regulation.
12. McKean, Some Problems of Criteria and Acquiring Information, in Environmental
Quality In a Growing Economy 61 (H. Jarett ed. 1966).
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spills oil killing all the fish, the loss to society is not the $60 worth of
fish, but only $10. The reason is that while $60 worth of fish are
killed, there would also be $50 worth of the fishing firm's resources
released for alternative uses. Consequently, the shipper should only
be induced to spend up to $10 to prevent an oil spill.
A more realistic situation, which points out the principle that
action concerning an externality is only appropriate if the gains to
society promise to exceed the cost to society, is one in which extent
of preventative methods and the number of fish killed can be varied.
As the oil shipper allocates more resources to methods of preventing
an oil spill (i. e., thicker hulls, better crews, better equipment, etc.)
fewer fish are killed. This situation is depicted by Figure 1. Through
the use of this figure it will be shown that the oil shipper should not
allocate resources to the extent of eliminating all risk of an oil spill,
because this would cost society more than it would gain. Instead, the
figure will theoretically show to what extent the oil shipper should
allocate resources to prevent a spill.
The line YX' indicates the incremental net benefits of fishing
preserved. The X-axis indicates the amount of oil pollution pre-
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Figure 1
UNITS OF POLLUTION PREVENTED BY COMBINATION
OF VARIED METHODS
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vented. At point X on the X-axis there is no damage. The Y-axis
indicates the cost and damages to the fisherman.
The function AB represents the cost of the optimal combination
of preventative measures to be taken by the oil shipper at various
units of pollution prevention desired. If oil spills are to be completely prevented (assuming it is possible), the damages to fish will be
zero (X'), but the cost in resources of prevention will be the area
AOBX'.
To what extent should the oil shipper be induced to prevent oil
spills? The oil shipper should be induced to expend AOTX amount
of resources to prevent oil pollution. This would avoid YOTX
amount of fish damage to the fish. To reach this level of prevention
the oil shipper would expend AOTX amount of resources. Adding
together the damages the oil shipper would have to pay for pollution
allowed and his costs of prevention, we arrive at OATX'. The net
benefit is YAT amount of fish damage and costs avoided. If he were
to allocate any more resources to prevent an oil spill, he would be
spending more than could be gained; this loss could be as much as
TX B. If he were to allocate up to SX' ' amount of resources instead
of TX amount of resources, society is foregoing the net benefit
ST' T. Therefore, for the maximum benefit in terms of fish damage
avoidance, the oil shipper should be induced to expend up to TX in
resources to prevent oil pollution.
The question then becomes how to induce the oil shipper to expend up to TX amount of resources to prevent oil pollution. While
this will be discussed after a review is made of our statutory law, a
few points bear mentioning now. If the legislature stated that the
waters shall remain absolutely pure, the shipper would have to expend AOBX' amount of resources. While there would be no damage
to fish, there would be a waste of resources depicted by the area
TX' B. It would be more efficient to legislatively induce the shipper
to expend up to TX amount of resources to prevent oil pollution,
and thereafter pay the damages indicated by the area TXX'.
B. Allocation of Resources after an Oil Spill
It was just shown that it would be inefficient for the shipper to
expend resources to the point of eliminating all probability of an oil
spill. It was pointed out that the shipper should only have to spend
up to TX, and thereafter pay only the damages that result from oil
spillage. The question then becomes, to what extent should the law
give the shipper incentive to clean up the oil that will probably spill?
Again, the principle that action concerning an externality is appropriate only if gains promise to exceed costs is applicable.
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Assume again that we have a situation where damages can be
varied by the extent of the cleanup procedures. This is depicted by
Figure 2.

MARGINA- C0. OF OPlMAL

COM3INATION OF

A

Figure 2
UNITS OF POLLUTION CLEANED UP

The line YX' indicates the incremental net benefits of fishing
preserved. The X-axis indicates the amount of oil cleaned up. To
clean up all the oil would cost the polluter OABX 1 . At each level of
cleanup is an optimal combination of oil cleanup procedures which
has a cost indicated by the area under line AB. At point X on the
X-axis, the cost of cleanup procedures is OATX. At point X" 1 on the
X-axis, the cost of cleanup is OASX1 . At point X on the X-axis, the
costs of cleanup (the area OATX), plus the damages created by the
oil not cleaned up (TXX 1 ) are minimized, and the net benefits from
the cleanup are maximized (the area YAT). If the polluter were to
allocate only OASX'' amount of resources to clean up the oil, he
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foregoes the net benefit ST 1 T by not expending OATX. If the
polluter were to expend more than OATX, he would be benefiting
less and less, and the cost would be greater and greater up to BX'.
Therefore, we do not want legislation that would require the polluter
to clean up all the oil spilled, but he should be required to clean up
the oil to point X on the X-axis, and thereafter pay for the damages
resulting from the oil not cleaned up. While there would be no
damage to fish if all the oil were cleaned up, there would be a waste
of resources depicted by the area TBX'. It would be more efficient
and just as equitable to legally induce the shipper to expend OATX
amount of resources to clean up the spilled oil, and thereafter pay
the damages caused by the remaining oil (the area TXX').
II
UNITED STATES STATUTORY LAW
A review of United States statutory law will point out: who is
burdened with the cost of externalities of shipping oil by vessels;
methods that are used to place the costs of the externalities; and to
what extent the costs of the externalities are placed.
The first federal legislation dealing with oil pollution was enacted
in 1886.' " This act dealt specifically with the pollution in New York
Harbor, but was followed by an act that also makes it unlawful to
pollute the Harbor of Hampton Roads and the Harbor of Baltimore.' ' The act makes it unlawful to discharge oil into any of these
harbors.' " Violation of the act is punishable by a fine of $250 to
$2,500, or imprisonment from 30 days to one year, either or both as
the judge may decide.' 6 Furthermore, it is provided that one half of
the fine is to be paid to any person who gives information which
leads to a conviction.' 7
was enacted which makes it unlawful to
In 1899, legislation
13. An act making appropriations for construction, repair and preservation of certain
public works on rivers and harbors and for other purposes, [hereinafter cited as: New York

Harbor Act] ch. 929, § 3, 24 Stat. 329 (1886).
14. New York Harbor Act, 33 U.S.C. 441, (1964), amending ch. 496, § 1, 25 Stat. 209
(1888).

15. In The Albania, 30 F.2d 727 (D.C. S.D. N.Y. 1928) it was held that oil was to be
construed to be included within the meaning of the statute although it was not specifically
mentioned.
16. New York Harbor Act, 33 U.S.C., 441,amending ch. 496, § 1, 25 Stat. 209 (1888).
17. Id.
18. Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 (Refuse Act), 33 U.S.C. 407 (1964). See United
States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224, 230, 16 L. Ed. 2d. 492, 496, 86 Sup. Ct. 1427,
1430 (1966) (The term " 'refuse' includes all foreign substances and pollutants" other than
sewage).
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discharge oil into any of the navigable waters of the United States.
The penalties are the same as those in the above act.' 9
In 1961 legislation was enacted to implement the provisions of the
International Convention for the Prevention of the Pollution of the
Sea by Oil, 195420, with certain amendments and recommendations." The act makes it unlawful to discharge oil into any of the
prohibited zones including a zone fifty miles around the United
States. 2 While the penalties are the same as those in the previous
acts, they only apply to American ships.3 Furthermore, the act
does not prohibit a discharge of oil from a ship for the purpose of
securing the safety of the ship, preventing damage to a ship or cargo,
or saving life at sea; or a discharge of oil resulting from damage to a
ship or unavoidable leakage, if all reasonable precautions are taken to
prevent or minimize the escape.2 4
The act also provides that whenever there is a discharge of oil it
must be recorded in the "oil record book."'2 Failure to make such
entry is punishable by a fine not exceeding $1000 nor less than
$500.26 If a false or misleading entry is made, punishment may
include imprisonment for a term of up to 6 months.2
III
LEGISLATION OF PENALTIES
With the exception of the recent Water Quality Improvement
Act 2 8 an examination of the United States oil pollution legislation
reveals a decided reliance upon penalties as a mechanism to place the
costs of oil pollution on the polluter. In order that penalties induce a
polluter to allocate sufficient resources to prevent pollution and
clean up spills, the penalty must compel the polluter to expend
OATX amount of resources to prevent pollution and in the event of
19. International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, May 29,
1961, Art. VI, (1961), 12 U.S.T. 2989.
20. Oil Pollution Act of 1961, 33 U.S.C. 1001-1015 (1966), amending 75 Stat. 402
(1961).
21. Id.

22. Id.
23. Id. § § 2, 6, 7, 33 U.S.C. 1001, 1005, 1006 (1970). Until the penalty is paid,
clearance of the ship can be withheld from any United States port and such penalty
constitutes a lien on the ship. The Coast Guard may also suspend or revoke a license issued
to the master or other licensed officer of a ship violating the provisions of the Act.
24. Id. § 4, 33 U.S.C. 1003 (1970).
25. Id. § 9, 33 U.S.C. 1008 (1970).

26. Id.
27. Id.

28. Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, § 102, 84 Stat. 91 (1970), 33 U.S.C.A.
§ 1161 (1970), amending Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948). This
act will be more fully discussed infra.
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a spill the penalty must compel the polluter to expend OATX
amount of resources to clean up. Moreover, to provide an equitable
solution, the penalty would have to be large enough to compensate
parties injured in the amount of TXX1 damages. The problem then is
to determine what penalty will compel each individual polluter to
expend OATX amount of resources to prevent and clean up oil spills,
and be of sufficient magnitude to compensate for the remaining
damages. To do this, the entity determining the penalty must have
certain information. The entity determining the penalty must know
the damage curve (i.e., YX' in Figures 1,2, and 3) and the cost curve
(i.e., AB in Figures 1, 2, and 3) for each individual oil shipper. It
must be remembered that these curves would also be constantly
changing. Even if this information were available for an efficient
allocation of resources and equitable compensation of injured
parties, each individual oil shipper would have a different penalty
due to their differing cost and damage curves. Such a system of
penalties would be too costly to operate, and as a result, usually one
penalty is chosen for all individuals shipping oil. However, when one
penalty is chosen, there will be an inefficient use of resources and
inequities. This can be demonstrated by Figure 3.
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The area under X1 Y indicates the net benefits of fishing preserved
for one individual shipper. The X-axis indicates either the units of oil
pollution prevented, or the units of oil spill cleaned up. The marginal
cost of optimal combinations of clean up or prevention measures is
indicated by line AB. As has already been demonstrated, efficient
allocation of resources demands prevention and cleanup to point X
on the X-axis. A single penalty cannot compel each individual
shipper to clean up and prevent X units of oil pollution. The penalty
may compel this individual shipper to clean up or prevent D or F
units of pollution. In either case there will be an inefficient allocation of resources. If the penalty compels prevention or removal of D
units of oil pollution instead of X units, there is a misallocation of
resources represented by ST1 T. If the penalty compels prevention or
removal of F units of oil pollution, there will be a misallocation of
resources represented by TS T1 1. Therefore, there will only be an
efficient allocation of resources if the penalty compels this individual
shipper as well as all other individual shippers to prevent spills, or in
the event of a spill, remove X units of oil pollution.
An equitable solution would also require the oil shipper to pay for
the damages that would result from the oil that was not cleaned up.
A penalty could accomplish this if it were sufficiently large to pay
for such damages as well as the costs of enforcement of the penalty.
IV
SUGGESTIONS TO REMEDY THE FAILURE OF THE MARKET MECHANISM
To have an efficient use of resources by inducing oil shippers to
allocate sufficient resources to prevent pollution and clean up spills,
and to have complete compensation for those who are damaged by
oil spills, two things are necessary. First, there must be placed upon
every polluter absolute liability for all damages proximately caused
by his activity. Second, to insure the effectiveness of this legal inducement (absolute liability) each potential polluter must be required to carry enough insurance to cover all probable damage.
A. Strict Liability
If all of the damages that would probably occur due to the oil
shipper's activity were placed upon the oil shipper he would be
induced to spend OATX amount of resources (see Figure 4) to prevent oil pollution, and spend OATX amount of resources (see Figure
5) to clean up an oil spill.' 9
29. It has already been shown that expending TX to prevent X units of pollution and to
clean up X units of pollution is the most efficient allocation of resources (see Economic
Considerations).
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In both Figures 4 and 5, line YX' indicates the incremental net
benefits of fishing preserved. 3 0 In Figure 4, the X-axis indicates the
units of oil pollution prevented; and in Figure 5, the X-axis indicates
the units of oil spill cleaned up. The reason that the oil shipper is
induced to expend OATX amount of resources is that by doing so he
minimizes the cost of prevention or cleanup and the damages. In
other words, by preventing X units of pollution (Figure 4), or by
cleaning up X units of oil spilled (Figure 5), he expends AOTX and
must pay for TXX' damages but avoids the damages AYT. If instead
he should prevent X'' units of pollution (Figure 4), or clean up X 1'
units of oil spilled (Figure 5), he expends AOT' X1 a and must pay
for SX 1 X1 damages but avoids damages YAST. Therefore, by not
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UNITS OF POLLUTION PREVENTED BY
COMBINATION OF VARIED METHODS
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30. The damaging effect of a given kind and quantity of oil often depends upon the
natural environmental conditions which prevail at the time of the spill. We take for granted
that statistical computations can be made to construct a line such as YX 1 .
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UNITS OF OILSPILL CLEANED UP

preventing X-units of pollution (Figure 4) and by not cleaning up
X-units of oil spilled, he foregoes saving himself STT 1 in damages. If
he should decide to prevent or clean up any amount of oil pollution
beyond X (Figures 4 and 5), it is obvious that he would be spending
more than could be gained. If he went all the way out to X1 units of
prevention (Figure 4) and cleanup (Figure 5), his added cost would
be represented by the area TBX 1 (Figures 4 and 5).
If a lesser form of liability were placed upon the individual
shipper, he would not be induced to prevent X-units of pollution
(Figure 4) or to clean up X-units of oil spilled (Figure 5) because it is
less likely that all of the damages would be placed on him. The lesser
amount of damages can be depicted by lines Y1 H in Figures 4 and 5.
In light of the preceding discussion as to damages inducing the most
efficient result, the polluter will no longer be compelled to prevent
X-units of pollution (Figure 4) or to clean up X-units of oil spilled
(Figure 5). Instead, he will be compelled to prevent X' 1 units of
pollution and to clean up X' 1 units of oil spilled. Since society's as
well as the fisherman's damages are indicated by line YX, the result
will be inefficient (represented by the area STT'), and the damages
ST 1 HX will not be compensated for.
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B. Compulsory Insurance
Even if absolute liability is placed upon each individual polluter,
this does not assure an efficient and equitable result. The reason for
this is that even though there is absolute liability for damages from
oil spills, a claimant can only recover to the extent of a polluter's
assets. If the polluter's assets consist of one ship and it has been
destroyed in a collision or a grounding or in an effort to stop the oil
spill,3 1 the claimant may have little or no recovery. As a result the
oil shipper will not be compelled to allocate resources most efficiently to prevent or clean up oil pollution. This effect can be
demonstrated by hyperbolas3 2 N (representing a shipper's assets
which are insufficient to cover the damages), and M (representing a
shipper's assets which are more than sufficient to cover damages)
superimposed on Figures 4 and 5. If an oil shipper has insufficient
assets (represented by line N), he will only spend OAT' 1 G (Figures 4
and 5). This will result in an inefficiency represented by S' T ,T
(Figures 4 and 5), and uncompensated damages in the amount represented by S' GX' (Figures 4 and 5). The reason is that he does not
have to minimize damages if he does not have the assets to pay for
the damages. If however, he has enough assets (line M in Figures 4
and 5) to pay for the damages, he will try to minimize damages by
expending OATX (Figures 4 and 5). To have an efficient allocation
of resources and to have complete compensation of injured parties,
there must either be proof of sufficient assets to cover pollution
damages or the requirement of compulsory insurance.
If an oil shipper cannot prove that he has sufficient assets to cover
the damages of oil pollution, he should be required by legislation to
obtain insurance. Thus, each individual's insurance premium will
reflect the risk of pollution damage his activity creates. The premium
becomes the vehicle by which the externalities of oil pollution are
placed upon the polluter. If the individual shipper, by reason of
unskilled officers and crews, poorly constructed ships, poor navigational equipment, and a lack of cleanup devices creates a high risk of
oil pollution damages, he will have to pay a large premium. If the
individual shipper, by reason of highly trained officers and crews,
strongly constructed ships, the latest navigational equipment and the
possession and skilled use of cleanup devices creates a low risk of oil
pollution damages, he will have to pay a low premium. 3 Thus, each
31. The Torrey Canyon was destroyed by bombs to ignite the oil remaining in her.
32. If a point is selected on the hyperbola, the area formed by drawing lines from that
point perpendicular to the X and Y axis, will be equal to the area formed by drawing such
perpendicular lines from any other point on the hyperbola.
33. It should be noted that these lists are not meant to be all inclusive or optimal.
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individual shipper will be induced to take steps to reduce the probability of oil pollution damages.
It can be demonstrated (by Figure 6) that the premiums will
compel individual shippers to take steps to reduce the probability of
oil pollution damages in the most efficient manner. We assume that
an individual shipper's scale of operation with his present equipment
and crew creates a 10 percent chance of a spill during the year. If we
assume the total damages of such a spill are $1000, we can compute
the incremental net damages avoided for each unit of effort taken to
reduce the probability of oil pollution (forming Line YX 1 ). Since the
damages are $1000 and a shipper only has a 10 percent chance of
causing those damages in a given year, the insurance company will
charge him a premium for the year of $100 ($1000 x .10). This
premium is represented in Figure 6 by the area OYX'. The X-axis
indicates the units of effort needed to reduce the probability of an
oil spill. The line AB indicates the marginal cost of optimal combination of waste withholding procedures. Since the shipper can lower his
premium rate by taking steps to reduce the probability of oil pollution, he will do so to the point where the cost of the next unit of
reduction is more than the cost of the premium, point X on the
Y,
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X-axis. This can be clarified by the following hypotheticals: If the
resources, he can reduce the probable
shipper expends OAT1 X'
damages of oil pollution to SX1 1 X1 . Therefore, his premium rate
will be reduced to SX' X1 at a cost of AOT X1 1, resulting in a net
premium reduction of YAT' S. However, by not expending OATX
amount of resources, he foregoes the added net premium reduction
of ST'T. If the shipper were to take any steps beyond point X on
the X-axis, the cost of doing so would be greater than the damage
avoided. The added cost would be XTBX' and the added benefit
would only be TXX'. Therefore, it would be most efficient to
expend OATX resources to reduce the risk of oil pollution and thereafter pay the premium rate of XTX' .
It should be noted that the placement of these externalities upon
the oil shipping industry causes the cost of carrying oil by vessels to go
up. This cost consists of a combination of the costs of risk reducing
efforts (OATX) and the premium cost (TXX'). As a result, the
supply curves (in Figure 7) will shift to the left S1 (Figure 7), causing

2

0
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Figure 7
UNITS OF PRODUCTION
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the price of oil and oil related products to go up (P to P') and the
level of oil shipping activity to go down (X to X1 ). Since the activity
of each individual shipper is decreased, there will not be as great a
risk of oil pollution damages (area YY 1 GX1 of Figure 6).
C Application of Strict Liability and Compulsory Insurance
Under a doctrine of strict liability, it has been said that the defendant acts "at his peril," and is an insurer against the consequences
of his conduct. Prosser states that what is meant is that the
defendant is liable although he has taken every possible precaution to
prevent harm, and is not at "fault" in any moral or social sense. 4
Thus, if strict liability was placed upon the conduct of the carriers of
oil, such carriers would be liable for pollution damage once the plaintiff shows the fact and cause of his damage. Under these circumstances it would be much more likely that the costs of pollution
would be placed upon the polluter.
It is usually argued that where fault is a meaningless concept, due
to the wide use of insurance, 35 and one party can absorb the loss or
spread the risk more readily than another, the liability should be
placed on the former. This could result in a very inefficient result,
should the person who is judged to be better able to absorb the
liability be the injured plaintiff. Another argument places liability on
the polluter because he knowingly is engaging in an activity so
hazardous that he should be willing to accept the cost of pollution
despite fault. 6 Strict liability has been applied to nuclear ships. In
34. W. Prosser, Torts 533 (3rd ed. 1964).
35. Almost all modern industries are insured and whether or not there is fault has little
control over the conduct of that industry. Conduct will, however, vary premium rates. In
the Preliminary Report to an International Sub-Committee of Inter-Governmental Maritime
Consultive Organization, LEG/WG (II). I/V.P.I. Lord Devlin states: "The principal argument
in favour of strict liability if a new convention is being prepared seems to me to be that it
would be a recognition of the change in economic and legal conditions that has been taking
place over the last half century. The policy of the law in England at any rate has been to
treat insurance as irrelevant; and the law of torts is framed and administered on the assumption, which has now become quite unrealistic, that the defendant will pay out of his own
pocket. On this footing it is easy to understand why the law should be careful to make a
defendant pay only when he is at fault. There was also the moral feeling that a man ought
not to escape payment if he was at fault; and in some early cases it was questioned whether
a contract of indemnity againstfault was not contrary to public policy. Now, however, that
undertakings are so much larger, it is rare, even in the absence of insurance, for the person
actually at fault to be the person who pays; and the spread of insurance has replaced the
question: 'Who is at fault?' with the question: 'Who can most fairly and conveniently pay
the premium?'"
36. Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 1 Ex. 265, 229 (1866), aff'd. L.R. 3H.L. 330 (1868). In the
Court of Exchequer Chamber, Mr. Justice Blackburn said, "[T] he true rule of law is, that
the person who for his own purposes brings on his lands and collects and keeps there
anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril..." Lord Cairns in
the House of Lords said that the principal applied only to a "non-natural" use of the

April 1971]

EXTERNALITIES OFA TORREY CANYON SITUATION

367

the Convention on the 3Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships, May
25, 1962,3 7 it is stated: 3
The operator of a nuclear ship shall be absolutely liable for any
nuclear damage upon proof that such damage has been caused by a
nuclear incident involving nuclear fuel of, or radioactive products or

waste produced in such ships.
The doctrine of absolute liability has also been applied in England to
the hazards of atomic operations.' 9
It should be noted that strict liability is not new to the law.
Historically, a trespasser has not been excused even though he
honestly and reasonably believes the land is his own. A bona fide
purchaser of stolen goods is also held liable for conversion under
similar circumstances. 4 0
If strict liability is to be the rule, it might be argued that the cargo
(oil) is the pollutant and therefore, the cargo owner should have to
pay the premium. The premium rate that cargo owner would pay
would depend upon his selection of carriers. If the cargo owner
selected a carrier that created a low risk of an oil spill, he would have
a low premium for that shipment. If, however, he selected a carrier
that created a high risk of an oil spill, he would have to pay a high
premium for that shipment. Thus, the cargo owner would be induced
to pick low risk carriers, and carriers would try to reduce their risk of
an oil spill. However, it would also be more difficult to require the
cargo owner to pay the insurance premium. Since the cargo owner
might use different carriers, there would have to be frequent complicated risk computations and expensive enforcement procedures. 4
While in the discussion of placement of liability the term insurance
was used, it should be noted that compulsory insurance should not
be confined to private or commercial insurance. Self-insurance, if
appropriately supervised, can also be an effective method of placing
the costs of the risk of oil pollution upon the possible polluter. There
could probably be a requirement that a certain amount of money be
kept in reserve depending upon the particular value of the assets
defendant's land, as distinguished from "any purpose for which it might in the ordinary
course of the enjoyment of land be used." [1868, L.R. 3 H.L. 330, 338]. In the United
States the doctrine includes drilling oil wells or operating refineries and factories emitting
smoke. W. Prosser, Torts 525-526 (3rd ed. 1964).
37. N. Singh, International Conventions of Merchant Shipping, at 1971. A proposed
treaty.
38. Id., Article II.
39. O.E.E.C. Conventions on third party liability in the field of Nuclear Energy, July 29,
1960. Vienna Protocol, 1963, effective April 1, 1968.
40. W. Prosser, Torts. 507 (3rd ed. 1964).

41. It might be difficult to ascertain who has title to the cargo.
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owned by the corporation. It might be argued, however, that the
private insurance industry might be more beneficial in that another
industry is interested in reducing the risk of oil pollution, resulting in
more research in this area. 2
If there is to be compulsory insurance, it is argued that there must
be limitation on liability. The argument for limitation of liability is
based on the policy of maintaining a strong merchant marine in the
United States,4 3 and the belief that without limitation of liability
shipowners could not survive large claims. 4 Also, it is argued that
absolute liability and no limitation will result in exorbitant premium
costs 4 I if such risk is insurable at all.4 6
42. Automobile insurers have been an effective force in searching for ways to reduce the
risk of automobile accidents.
43. Merchant Marine Act of 1936, 46 U.S.C. 1101 (1964): "It is necessary for the
national defense and development of its foreign and domestic commerce that the United
States shall have a merchant marine..."
44. The effect of limitation of liability on the amount of the damages that could be
1
claimed can be depicted by Figure 6. The area OPSX represents the area that can be
claimed as damages, while the area YPS cannot be claimed as damages.
45. Statement of Paul J. Kreuzkamp, Marine Insurance Committee, Insurance Brokers'
Association of the State of New York. Hearings on H.R. 4148 and Related Bills Before the
Comm. on Public Works House of Representatives, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., at 549 (1969).
"The U.S. shipowner and operator is faced with not being able to purchase
sufficient liability insurance to cover his existing exposures for loss of life and
personal injury of seamen, passengers and other persons, together with damage
to cargo and other property. Five years ago the average U.S. shipowner and
operator could purchase at a reasonable cost approximately $30,000,000 total
coverage for marine liabilities. Today, this capacity has been reduced to approximately $17,500,000, with the premium cost factor for $15,000,000 of
this total amount being increased by approximately 400%. In the majority of
cases approximately $17,250,000 is insured by the British insurance market,
either as direct participation or as reinsurance. The remaining $250,000 is
insured by the American insurance market. The reasons for this situation are:
1. Very adverse claims experience for the five years on hull insurance, that
is, physical loss of or damage insurance on the vessel.
2. Since British underwriters oftentimes participate on allthree insurance
coverages, they have decided to reduce substantially the amount of insurance they will provide for each of the three insurances described. This
is particularly evident in the case of liability insurance.
3. In addition, British underwriters have suffered very severe claims experience on non-marine property excess insurance during the past four
years.
4. Because of this adverse claims experience-both marine and nonmarine-the underwriting market place has become a seller's market. The
underwriter therefore dictates the insurance premium cost, and if such
premium is not met, he will not participate in the coverage. Also, when
the underwriter is asked to write insurance beyond what he prudently
considers his capacity, he will demand exorbitant premium costs which
the American shipowners find prohibitive."
46. Id. at 549, 550. Mr. Kreuzkamp believes if there is absolute liability with no limita-
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If the insurance industry could not handle the coverage in such a
way as to reflect the true value of the risk, the result would be an
overcharge for the oil shipping industry and an inefficient use of
resources on the whole. If this is the case, perhaps the government
could offer reinsurance at rates which truly reflect the cost of the
risk.4" Such a program would allow insurance companies to pay a
small charge for protection from any unusual losses. Such a charge
would permit rates to be calculated on the basis of expected annual
losses over a number of years plus a small reinsurance charge. The
private companies would still market policies, but would know that
following a series of severe catastrophes they would still be assured
of financial stability.
It is the purpose of this paper to propose the most equitable and
efficient suggestion to compensate for the externalities created by
shipping oil. To satisfy this purpose, it would be inconsistent to
suggest that legislation should be adopted limiting the liability for
damages caused by oil pollution. It is contended that the full costs of
the risk of oil pollution should be borne by the individual or industry
that creates that risk. If any lesser liability were to be applied, the
insurance premiums would not reflect the true value of the risk, and
therefore, the industry would not be taking into account all the costs
of carrying on its business and would not be sufficiently induced to
eliminate the risks created by its activities. If the oil shipping industry desires to carry on the activity of shipping oil, it must be
willing to pay the entire cost of the risk.
tion there is a loss of incentive for the fully insured entity to operate in a safe and prudent
manner and as a result such a situation may be uninsurable. This would not be the case.
1. There would still be the criminal penalties for misconduct mentioned
above.
2. Since a shipowner's ability to carry on the activity of shipping oil is
dependent upon his ability to get insurance at as low a cost as possible, he will
do what he can to eliminate risk. He may consider such things as better crews,
better navigation equipment, improved construction, and the use of recent
technological developments. His conduct will determine whether the premium
he pays will be small or large. The premium he pays will determine whether or
not he can continue to ship oil.
3. If the private market cannot meet the needs of such a package (absolute
liability and unlimited liability) perhaps the government could insure or
indemnify. Under the Atomic Energy Act the government indemnifies a
licensee beyond the amount of insurance available from private sources or
beyond the level of financial protection determined by the government
through the Commission, 42 U.S.C. 2210 (1970).
47. Besides having the funds to withstand damages from a large spill, a government
reinsurance plan would save the private insurer costly underwriting and transfer fees. If such
a program were adopted, the government would come to the rescue as the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation has promised in case a bank has a run on its deposits.
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V
THE WATER QUALITY IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 1970

The Water Quality Improvement Act of 197048 takes some major
steps forward in the placement of the costs of oil pollution on the
polluter.
The Act prohibits the discharge of oil into the navigable waters of
the United States or into the waters of the contiguous zone4 9 in
quantities determined harmful by the President." ° "Discharge" is
defined to include any spilling or dumping of oil." 1 If the oil was
knowingly discharged, the owner or operator 2 of the vessel will be
assessed a civil penalty of not more than $ 10,000. s ' Furthermore, if
the person in charge of the vessel fails to immediately notify the
appropriate Federal Agency of the discharge, he will be subject to a
fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment of not more than
one year, or both.5 4
The heart of the Act authorizes the President to remove any oil
discharged into the navigable waters of the United States or waters of
the contiguous zone,5 s directs him to prepare a National Contingency Plan to carry out the removal5 6 and authorizes the appropriation of a revolving fund of $35,000,000 to carry out the
provisions of the Act.5 " This revolving fund will be reimbursed by
funds received in the enforcement of the Act.5 8
The Act also provides that unless the owner or operator of a vessel
can prove that the prohibited discharge resulted solely from an act of
God, I an act of war, an act of United States Government neglig48. Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, § 102, 84 Stat. 91 (1970), 33 U.S.C.A.
§ 1151 (1970),amending 62 Stat. 1155 (1948).
49. Id. § 11(a)(9), 33 U.S.C.A. § 1161(a)(9) (1970). The contiguous zone is that zone
contiguous to the territorial waters of the United States. The Convention on the Territorial
Sea and Contiguous Zone, Apr. 12, 1961, Art. 24, para. 2, (1964), 15 U.S.T. 1606, limits
the contiguous zone to 12 miles.
50. Id. § 11(b)(2), 33 U.S.C.A. § 1161(b)(2) (1970). Excepted from this prohibition are
discharges into waters of the contiguous zone permitted under Article IV of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, May 29, 1961
(1961), 12 U.S.T. 2989, and discharges the President by regulation determines unharmful
(see Executive Order 11548, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1101 (Supp. 1971).
51. Id. § 1l(a)(2), 33 U.S.C.A. § 1161(a)(2) (1970).
52. Id. § 11(a)(6), 33 U.S.C.A. § 1161(a)(6) (1970) any person owning, operating, or
chartering by demise such vessel.
53. Id. § 11(b)(5), 33 U.S.C.A. § 1161(b)(5) (1970). In determining the amount of this
penalty the Secretary of Transportation may consider the size of the business of the owner
or operator and the effect it will have on his business.
54. Id. § 1l(b)(4), 33 U.S.C.A. § 1161(b)(4) (1970).
55. Id. § lI(c)(1), 33 U.S.C.A. § 1161(c)(1) (1970).
56. Id. § 11(c)(2), 33 U.S.C.A. § 1161(c)(2) (1970).
57. Id. § Il(k), 33 U.S.C.A. § 1161(k) (1970).
58. Id.
59. Id. § 11(a)(12), 33 U.S.C.A. § 1161(a)(12) (1970). " 'Act of God' means an act
occasioned by an unanticipated grave natural disaster."
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ence, or an act or omission of a third party (or any combination of
the foregoing)6 0 he will be absolutely liable to the United States for
the costs of cleanup in an amount not to exceed the lesser of $100
per gross ton of such vessel or $14,000,000.61 Furthermore, if the
United States can show that the discharge was ".

.

. the result of

'willful negligence' or 'willful misconduct' within the privity and
knowledge of the owner.

. ."

such owner or operator will be liable to

the United States for the full amount of the cleanup costs.6 2
To insure that owners of vessels are financially responsible for
removal of the oil the Act provides that one year after April 3, 1970
any vessel over three hundred gross tons, using any port or place in
the United States or the navigable waters of the United States must
establish and maintain evidence of financial responsibility6 3 of $100
per gross ton or $14,000,000, whichever is lesser.6 4
The Act also makes provision for limiting the hazard of a spill or
imminent discharge after a marine disaster upon the navigable waters
of the United States. If such a situation creates a substantial threat of
a pollution hazard to the public
health or welfare of the United
65
States, the United States may:
... (A) coordinate and direct all public and private efforts directed

at the removal or elimination of such threat; and (B) summarily
remove, and, if necessary, destroy such vessel by whatever means are
available without regard to any provision of law governing the employment of personnel or the expenditure of appropriated funds....
The liability of the owner or operator for such costs is the same as
though such costs were incurred for removing unlawfully discharged
oil.6 6 It is hoped that this provision will eliminate some of the
indecision which allowed the Torrey Canyon to emit over 60,000
tons of crude oil over a ten day period.
60. Id. § Il(f)(1), 33 U.S.C.A. § 1161(f)(1) (1970).
61. If such third party was the owner or operator of a vessel which caused the discharge
he will be absolutely liable to the United States for the costs of cleanup in an amount not to
exceed the lesser of $100 per gross ton of such vessel or $14,000,000. If the United States
can show the discharge was the result of willful negligence or willful misconduct within the
privity and knowledge of such owner or operator, he will be liable for the full amount of the
removal costs. Id. § ll(g), 33 U.S.C.A. § 1161(g) (1970).
62. For this additional liability the United States may rely on a maritime lien on the
vessel, if it is in existence, and may also sue the owner or operator in any court of competent jurisdiction. Id. § 11(f)(1), 33 U.S.C.A. § 1161(f)(1) (1970).
63. This may be established by evidence of insurance, surety bonds, qualification as a
self-insurer, or "other evidence." Id. § l1(p)(1), 33 U.S.C.A. § 1161(p)(1) (1970).
64. Id. By requiring all vessels to carry this amount of proof of responsibility some of the
cost of the risk of oil pollution created by vessels shipping oil is placed upon those vessels
engaged in activities other than that of shipping oil. Thus, the premium paid by the oil
shipper will be artificially low and will not compel him to allocate sufficient resources to
reduce the risk of a spill.
65. Id. § 11(d), 33 U.S.C.A. § 1161(d) (1970).
66. Id.
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While the Act comes a long way in placing the costs of preventing
and cleaning up oil pollution on the entity that creates the risk of
pollution, its effect is limited in two ways. The Act fails to hold the
oil carrier liable for the full amount of the removal costs6 ' and fails
to hold him liable for these costs regardless of fault.6 8 As a result,
the insurance premiums 6 9 paid by the oil shipping industry will not
reflect the full cost of removal of the oil which in turn will cause the
oil shipping industry to expend an insufficient amount of resources
to prevent an oil spill. Furthermore, this premium does not reflect
the cost of the damages to privately owned or publicly owned
property; 7 0 it only reflects the cost of oil pollution removal.
For the protection of United States coastlines from oil pollution,
for adequate compensation for those injured by oil pollution, and for
the most efficient allocation of resources legislation must be enacted
that will place the full cost of the removal of the oil and the full
costs of any injuries caused by the oil spill on the entity that creates
the risk of an oil spill. To accomplish this the legislation must provide for unlimited financial responsibility and hold the oil shipper
liable regardless of fault.

67. Id. § 11(f(1), 33 U.S.C.A. § 1161(0(1) (1970). The oil carrier's liability is limited

to the smaller of $100 per gross ton of such vessel or $14,000,000 unless there is proof of
willful negligence or willful misconduct.
68. Id. The oil carrier is not liable for the removal of the oil if he can prove the discharge
was the result of an Act of God, an act of war, negligence on the part of the United States
Government, or an act of a third party. This will mean that the expense of proving financial
responsibility to pay for removal of oil will fall upon persons that are not engaged in the
activity of shipping oil.
69. Id. § ll(p)(1), 33 U.S.C.A. § l161(p)(1) (1970), or the cost of any other approved
method of proving financial responsibility.
70. Since it would be an inefficient use of resources to remove or to prevent all oil
pollution, some oil pollution damage is likely to occur. These damages are represented by
TXX1 in Figure 5. In the discussion under the section "Compulsory Insurance" the
premium rate also reflected the cost of the damages resulting from an oil spill.

